U.S. Financial Policy in an Era of Chinese Ascendancy

By M. Herzog, 11. April 2025

History and Strategic Responses 

Introduction 

The rise of China and its partners in the BRICS bloc has challenged the long-standing dominance of the United States in global finance. In response, the U.S. government appears to be crafting financial policy measures to reinforce the primacy of the U.S. dollar, even as alternative currency strategies emerge. One notable strategy under discussion is the promotion of stablecoins – privately issued digital tokens pegged to national currencies – as a counterweight to new currencies or payment systems backed by physical gold reserves. This article provides a comprehensive historical analysis of U.S. financial policy development, from 19th-century protectionism and the gold standard to the Bretton Woods system, the 1971 end of gold convertibility, and the 1985 Plaza Accord. It then examines how each presidential administration influenced U.S. financial policy, setting the stage for current policy intentions. A separate section speculates on a prospective “Mar-a-Lago Agreement” under a potential second Trump administration – envisioning how stablecoins might substitute for gold in international trade blocs and how access to U.S. markets could be leveraged for strategic realignment. Finally, the article explores the implications of these policies for Europe, especially if transatlantic market access and financial infrastructure become contingent on political alignment. The verifiable historical and contemporary analysis is presented first, followed by clearly delineated speculative discussion. Throughout, data from government sources, international institutions, academic research, and financial media are used to inform this scholarly review. 

Historical Foundations of U.S. Financial Policy Development 

19th-Century Protectionism and the Gold Standard 

In the late 19th century, as the United States industrialized, its economic policy was characterized by protectionist tariffs and a commitment to the gold standard. High import tariffs were used to shield American manufacturers from European competition. For example, the McKinley Tariff of 1890 raised average import duties to nearly 50% – a “high-water mark of 19th-century U.S. protectionism” . This Republican-led tariff policy reflected a broader mercantilist philosophy linking national power to industrial growth and export strength. In the monetary realm, the U.S. moved to solidify a gold-based currency. The Coinage Act of 1873 (“the Crime of 1873” to its detractors) effectively put the U.S. on a de facto gold standard, discontinuing the free coinage of silver . This sparked a populist backlash (the “Free Silver” movement) as farmers and debtors argued for bimetallism to encourage mild inflation. The political battles of the 1890s – exemplified by William Jennings Bryan’s famous “Cross of Gold” speech in 1896 – pitted proponents of an expanded silver-backed money supply against those defending “sound money” in the form of gold-backed dollars . Ultimately, the victory of William McKinley in 1896 cemented the gold standard and protectionist tariffs as dual pillars of U.S. policy. Republican campaign materials even touted the gold dollar and high tariffs together as twin assurances of prosperity, casting the opposition’s free silver and lower tariffs as recipes for economic ruin . By 1900, the Gold Standard Act formally codified gold as the sole metallic standard for U.S. currency, aligning America’s monetary system with that of other leading powers. These 19th-century choices – protecting industry with tariffs and anchoring money to gold – laid a foundation for U.S. economic expansion, but also foreshadowed future tensions between domestic interests and international monetary stability. 

From Boom to Bust: The Great Depression and Policy Responses 

The early 20th century saw the U.S. ascend to global creditor status after World War I, but also exposed vulnerabilities in its financial system. In the 1920s, the U.S. maintained high tariffs (e.g. the Fordney–McCumber Tariff of 1922) and returned to the prewar gold parity, constraining monetary flexibility. These policies contributed to trade imbalances and a build-up of debt as American lending fueled European recovery. The Great Depression that began with the 1929 stock market crash prompted a dramatic re-evaluation of both trade and monetary policy. In 1930, as the downturn worsened, Congress passed the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act, hiking tariffs by about 20% on thousands of imports . This protectionist wave “ignited an international trade war and helped sink [the U.S.] into the Great Depression,” as later noted by President Ronald Reagan . Global trade contracted violently – by some estimates world trade collapsed by roughly 65% in the early 1930s – exacerbating the economic pain worldwide. At the same time, adherence to the gold standard hindered an aggressive monetary response to the banking crises and deflation. Many countries responded by devaluing their currencies or suspending gold convertibility, but the U.S. initially clung to gold, deepening deflationary pressure. It was not until 1933, after Franklin D. Roosevelt took office, that the U.S. suspended gold convertibility for domestic purposes (allowing the dollar to weaken) and embarked on New Deal recovery efforts. Roosevelt’s policies, including abandoning the strict gold standard and enacting bank reforms, eventually stabilized the banking system and reflated prices. Internationally, the U.S. convened the 1933 London Economic Conference to address currency stabilization, but disagreements (and Roosevelt’s preference for domestic recovery over fixed exchange rates) led to its failure . The lessons of the Depression era – that uncoordinated protectionism and rigid adherence to gold had worsened the crisis – profoundly shaped U.S. thinking in the subsequent decade. By the early 1940s, American officials recognized that a more cooperative and flexible global financial system was needed to prevent future economic collapse. 

Bretton Woods (1944) and the Dawn of Dollar Hegemony 

As World War II came to an end, the United States took the lead in designing a new international monetary order to promote stability and growth. In July 1944, delegates from 44 allied nations gathered in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and created the Bretton Woods system, with the U.S. dollar at its center . Under this system, each country pegged its currency to the U.S. dollar (with a narrow band for adjustments), and the dollar in turn was fixed to gold at $35 per ounce . This effectively made the dollar as good as gold in international settlements, cementing its role as the world’s primary reserve currency . Two key institutions were established: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to monitor exchange rates and provide emergency balance-of-payments loans, and the World Bank to finance postwar reconstruction and development . The U.S. – emerging from the war with the strongest economy and the largest gold reserves – was the unquestioned linchpin of this new system. American officials envisioned that a dollar-anchored regime would prevent the beggar-thy-neighbor currency devaluations and trade barriers that had worsened the Great Depression . By 1958, the Bretton Woods arrangements were fully operational: major currencies became convertible to dollars, and foreign central banks accumulated dollar reserves with the promise that the U.S. Treasury would redeem those dollars for gold at $35/oz as needed . This era (sometimes called “Bretton Woods I”) saw unprecedented growth and trade expansion across Western economies. The U.S. benefited immensely – the dollar became the preeminent reserve and transaction currency, sometimes referred to as an “exorbitant privilege” for the United States. However, the system was inherently dependent on U.S. economic discipline. By the 1960s, U.S. inflation and fiscal deficits (partly due to the Vietnam War and domestic spending) began eroding confidence in the dollar’s fixed value. Foreign central banks, notably France under President de Gaulle, started demanding gold for their excess dollars, straining U.S. gold reserves. The seeds of Bretton Woods’ collapse were sown in these imbalances: as worldwide dollar holdings grew, the U.S. gold stock remained finite, eventually undermining the credibility of the $35 peg . 

The Nixon Shock of 1971: End of the Gold–Dollar Link 

On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon unilaterally suspended the dollar’s convertibility into gold, effectively ending the Bretton Woods system. This decision – often termed the “Nixon Shock” – responded to the acute problem of foreign-held dollars far exceeding U.S. gold reserves, which meant the U.S. could no longer guarantee gold redemption at $35/oz . Nixon’s move ushered in a new era of fiat currency: the dollar would henceforth float in value, backed only by the credibility of the U.S. government rather than a fixed gold parity . At the time, this marked a dramatic reordering of global finance. Yet in retrospect, it reinforced U.S. monetary supremacy in a different form. As historian Barry Eichengreen observes, only the United States had the geopolitical and financial clout to take such a step and have its currency remain accepted as the global standard . In the short run, the dollar depreciated in the early 1970s (major currencies were revalued upward in the 1971 Smithsonian Agreement, then floated after 1973), and inflation spiked due to loose monetary policy and oil shocks. But the U.S. also took steps to buttress the dollar’s central role: notably, a tacit deal with Saudi Arabia and OPEC in the mid-1970s ensured that oil would be priced in dollars worldwide, inaugurating the “petrodollar” system . This meant countries needed U.S. dollars to buy oil, sustaining demand for dollars even without gold convertibility. By demonstrating its willingness to rewrite the rules of the global monetary order – and succeeding – the U.S. showed the extent of its financial power. The dollar remained de facto the world’s reserve currency after 1971, its dominance unshaken even as the IMF’s fixed-exchange regime gave way to a mix of floating and managed currencies. American policymakers in subsequent administrations embraced the flexibility afforded by fiat money. They could pursue domestic goals (such as stimulating growth or curbing inflation) without the strictures of gold parity, while still relying on the dollar’s international acceptance. Indeed, over the ensuing decades, the dollar’s reserve status grew alongside the expansion of global financial markets and U.S. Treasury debt. By the 1980s, the world was on a “dollar standard” rather than a gold standard – a fact made explicit by Nixon’s Treasury Secretary John Connally, who quipped to Europeans in 1971: “The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.” 

The Plaza Accord and Late 20th-Century Adjustments  

By the mid-1980s, the United States faced new financial challenges as a result of its own macroeconomic policies. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration’s large budget deficits and the Federal Reserve’s high interest rates (set by Chairman Paul Volcker to break the back of inflation) led to a soaring dollar on foreign exchange markets. From 1980 to 1985, the U.S. dollar’s value rose roughly 50% against other major currencies . While a strong dollar helped tame domestic inflation, it also made U.S. exports expensive and imports cheap, contributing to a record trade deficit and pressure on American manufacturing. To address this imbalance, the U.S. orchestrated a landmark international agreement – the Plaza Accord of 1985. In September 1985, finance ministers of the G5 nations (United States, Japan, West Germany, France, and the UK) met at New York’s Plaza Hotel and agreed to coordinate intervention to weaken the U.S. dollar relative to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark . The goal was to rectify the “mounting U.S. trade deficit” by making American goods more competitive abroad . The plan worked: over the next two years, the dollar’s exchange value fell by roughly 40% against the yen and mark, helping to reverse the U.S. trade imbalance (though with a lag) . The Plaza Accord exemplified how U.S. financial policy could be flexibly adjusted through international cooperation when needed. Notably, it was the first major instance since Bretton Woods of the U.S. explicitly managing the dollar’s value in concert with allies. Domestically, the late 1980s also saw deregulation in financial markets and growing capital flows. An unintended side effect of Plaza was financial turbulence elsewhere – for instance, the sharp yen appreciation contributed to Japan’s asset bubble and subsequent “Lost Decade” . A follow-up pact, the Louvre Accord of 1987, sought to stabilize exchange rates after the dollar had fallen enough. By the end of the 1980s, U.S. financial leadership meant balancing multiple roles: maintaining domestic economic strength, managing the dollar’s external value, and coordinating global economic policy through forums like the G5/G7. Each presidential administration had put its stamp on financial policy: Reagan’s team prioritized anti-inflation and later competitiveness, even if it meant a tactical weak-dollar policy at Plaza; earlier, Nixon had prioritized U.S. flexibility by ending gold convertibility; FDR had prioritized recovery by leaving the gold standard in 1933. This historical pattern shows U.S. willingness to dramatically shift policy doctrines (gold vs. fiat, protectionism vs. multilateralism, strong vs. weak dollar) to safeguard national economic interests and global influence. 

Globalization, Crisis, and China’s Emergence (1990s–2010s) 

After the Cold War, the 1990s brought a wave of globalization and financial liberalization that further entrenched U.S. economic dominance – but also set the stage for new competitors like China. Under President Bill Clinton, the U.S. championed free trade agreements (NAFTA in 1994) and supported China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The Clinton Treasury, led by Secretary Robert Rubin, also articulated the so-called “strong dollar policy.” Rubin famously stated that “a strong dollar is in the interest of the United States” , and throughout the late 1990s the U.S. refrained from intervening in currency markets, allowing market forces (and robust U.S. growth) to keep the dollar strong. This stance reassured foreign investors and helped attract capital to U.S. assets. At the same time, the U.S. dollar’s international usage expanded off-shore: global debt issuance in dollars grew, and many emerging markets pegged their currencies to the dollar or held dollars in reserve . The continued dominance of the dollar allowed the U.S. to exercise geopolitical power through finance – for example, the U.S. could impose economic sanctions by restricting access to the dollar-based financial system. As one analysis noted, even while the U.S. stopped managing the dollar’s value directly, it “increasingly relied on the dollar to intervene in other countries,” using the currency’s clout to influence foreign actors . A dramatic illustration came earlier, in 1956: President Eisenhower forced Britain and France to abandon the Suez Canal invasion by threatening to withhold support for the British pound, demonstrating U.S. financial leverage over its allies . By the 2000s, the dollar-centric system faced a new test in the rise of China’s economy. China’s GDP surged after joining the WTO, and it accumulated massive dollar reserves (peaking over $4 trillion) by running trade surpluses with the U.S. and recycling the proceeds into U.S. Treasury bonds. This arrangement – sometimes dubbed “Bretton Woods II” – meant the U.S. received abundant capital to fund its deficits, while China gained export-led growth and kept its currency (the renminbi) undervalued. However, it also made the U.S. financially dependent on a strategic rival’s lending. The vulnerabilities of a unipolar dollar system became evident in the 2008 global financial crisis, which originated in U.S. mortgage markets. The crisis shook confidence and led to calls for diversifying the global monetary order. In 2008, leaders from countries like China and Russia began suggesting a move away from sole dollar dominance (even raising the idea of IMF Special Drawing Rights or other alternatives). Indeed, as historian Adam Tooze documents, many nations at the United Nations in late 2008 criticized the U.S.-centric monetary regime for spreading instability . The immediate response, however, was to stabilize the existing system: the Federal Reserve led unprecedented liquidity swap lines with foreign central banks to shore up dollar funding globally, and the G20 coordinated stimulus measures. The post-2008 period saw the U.S. Federal Reserve undertake large-scale quantitative easing (QE) – injecting liquidity by buying Treasuries and mortgage bonds – which some feared might debase the dollar. Yet paradoxically, the dollar grew even more dominant in some respects after the crisis, as it remained the safe haven of choice. Under President Barack Obama (2009–2017), the U.S. focused on financial regulatory reform (the Dodd-Frank Act) and continued an official stance supporting a strong dollar (though the dollar’s value fluctuated with market conditions). Meanwhile, China’s ascent continued: by the mid-2010s China became the world’s second-largest economy and began to internationalize the renminbi (for instance, achieving its inclusion in the IMF’s reserve currency basket in 2016). The stage was set for heightened strategic competition in finance. Notably, U.S. policymakers increasingly viewed China’s state-driven economic model and currency practices (such as persistent intervention to hold down the RMB’s value) as threats to U.S. economic interests. This culminated in a stark shift during Donald Trump’s presidency (2017–2021), which revived elements of protectionism and economic nationalism. 

Trump Administration (2017–2021): Trade Wars and Dollar Contradictions 

President Donald J. Trump came to office with an overtly mercantilist economic agenda. Departing from the free-trade consensus of previous administrations, Trump raised tariffs on trading partners – most prominently launching a trade war with China in 2018, imposing tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods. This reflected his view that U.S. trade deficits were undermining American industry and power. It was a modern echo of 19th-century protectionism, aimed at forcing trade partners to concede better terms. At the same time, Trump was outspoken on currency matters. He frequently complained that U.S. allies and China were manipulating exchange rates to weaken their currencies and gain export advantages. He broke with the tradition of presidents refraining from commenting on the dollar’s level – on several occasions Trump indicated he wanted a weaker dollar to help U.S. exports, even as his Treasury officially maintained that “a strong dollar is in our interest.” This ambiguity highlighted a core tension in Trump’s approach: a “crypto-mercantilist” vision that sought to boost U.S. competitiveness and also preserve the dollar’s international supremacy . The Trump Treasury did once formally label China a “currency manipulator” (in 2019), though the designation was short-lived. More concretely, the administration experimented with financial sanctions as a tool of statecraft – for instance, using the dollar’s central role to cut off Iranian and Venezuelan regimes from the global banking system. This reinforced for U.S. rivals the perils of dollar dependence, spurring them to seek alternative reserve assets like gold or to build non-dollar payment networks. By the end of Trump’s first term, the stage was set for a great-power contest not just in trade and technology, but in the monetary sphere as well. U.S. financial policy was evolving accordingly, as described in the next section. 

China’s Economic Ascent and the Turn to Gold by BRICS 

China’s dramatic economic rise over the past four decades – with growth averaging ~10% per year until the 2010s – has fundamentally altered the balance of global economic power. In 2000, China accounted for only about 4% of global GDP; by the mid-2020s, it accounts for over 18% (at market exchange rates) and is the world’s largest economy in purchasing-power parity terms. This economic ascent has enabled China, and other large emerging economies, to accumulate substantial financial resources. Notably, China holds trillions in foreign exchange reserves (much in U.S. Treasury bonds) and has steadily increased its holdings of physical gold. The same is true for Russia, India, and other nations in the BRICS coalition (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), especially after experiencing U.S. financial sanctions or observing their possibility. In recent years, BRICS leaders have openly discussed reducing reliance on the U.S. dollar – a process often termed “de-dollarization.” One manifestation of this has been a sharp rise in central bank gold purchases. According to the World Gold Council, central banks worldwide purchased a record 1,136 tonnes of gold in 2022, the highest annual total since at least 1950 . This trend continued into 2023 and 2024, with annual central bank gold buying remaining above 1,000 tonnes . The surge is being led by emerging market central banks – notably China’s People’s Bank of China, which disclosed significant gold accumulation after 2022, and others like Russia, Turkey, and India . The motivations are clear: gold is seen as a stable store of value that is not controlled by any single country and cannot be sanctioned or frozen like foreign exchange reserves . By increasing gold reserves, these countries aim to diversify away from the U.S. dollar and insure against geopolitical risks . The geopolitical catalyst for this trend was partly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent Western sanctions on Russia’s dollar reserves. That event served as a wake-up call that dollar assets could be made inaccessible by U.S. and allied governments, encouraging countries outside the Western bloc to seek alternative reserve assets . 

Within the BRICS, discussions have gone beyond just holding gold – there have been proposals for a new trade currency or payment system potentially anchored by gold or commodities. In 2023, speculation arose about a possible “BRICS coin” or a unit of account backed by a basket of BRICS currencies or gold. While the August 2023 BRICS summit did not create a new currency, it did emphasize increasing trade in local currencies and reducing dollar use . Russia in particular, facing exclusion from much of the dollar-based system, has advocated alternative currency arrangements. By 2024, BRICS finance officials remained vague on a unified currency, recognizing internal challenges (the bloc includes very diverse economies) . Instead, individual efforts like China’s digital yuan (e-CNY) and the expanding Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) are being leveraged to facilitate non-dollar trade . The common denominator in these trends is an increased reliance on tangible reserves like gold and on non-Western financial infrastructure, as a counterweight to U.S. financial hegemony. By late 2024, BRICS central banks on average held only around 10% of their reserves in gold, but analysts at Bank of America noted they “should” raise that to 30% for optimal diversification – a shift that would imply adding another 11,000 tonnes of gold in coming years . Gold prices have responded accordingly, reaching all-time highs (over $3,000/oz by 2025) amid this demand . 

It is in this context – BRICS nations building hard reserves and exploring new currencies – that the United States is formulating its response. The U.S. sees a potential threat to dollar dominance if a critical mass of countries were to transact in a gold-backed currency or a digital yuan network, bypassing traditional dollar channels. Notably, American policymakers are aware that a BRICS gold-backed “stablecoin” or digital currency could gain appeal as an inflation-proof, politically independent medium of exchange . In mid-2023, commentators speculated that “the BRICS, principally Russia, China & India will counter any attempt by the US to introduce a hegemonic, USD-backed stablecoin – with a gold-backed stablecoin”, arguing that many countries would prefer a currency tethered to gold’s intrinsic value over one that extends U.S. monetary influence . Although BRICS did not launch a joint gold stablecoin in 2023, the mere discussion of it prompted strong reactions from U.S. leaders. Former President Trump warned in late 2024 that if the BRICS “play games with the dollar” by creating their own currency, they would face “100% tariffs” on their exports to the United States . This extraordinary threat underscored how seriously the U.S. takes the prospect of a rival international currency system. In sum, China’s economic rise and the BRICS’ turn toward gold and local currencies represent the most significant challenge to U.S. financial preeminence since World War II. The following section analyzes the current U.S. policy intentions aimed at meeting this challenge – particularly the turn toward stablecoins not backed by central banks as a counter-move in the currency competition. 

The U.S. Response: Stablecoins and Dollar-Based Digital Infrastructure 

Embracing Stablecoins to Extend Dollar Dominance 

Facing the BRICS gold strategy and China’s advances in financial tech, the United States is signaling an intention to leverage USD-backed stablecoins as a strategic instrument. Stablecoins are digital tokens (typically issued on blockchain networks) that maintain a peg to a reference asset, often a fiat currency like the U.S. dollar. Unlike a central bank digital currency (CBDC) which would be issued directly by the Federal Reserve, these stablecoins are generally issued by private entities and backed by reserves of dollars or dollar-equivalents. Over the past few years, USD stablecoins such as Tether (USDT) and USD Coin (USDC) have grown exponentially in circulation. As of early 2025, approximately $170–220 billion worth of stablecoins are in circulation globally, and over 98% of them are pegged to the U.S. dollar . In the year 2024 alone, total stablecoin transaction volume exceeded $27.6 trillion, which astonishingly surpassed the combined volume of Visa and Mastercard payments in that year . This implies that dollar-linked stablecoins have already become a major medium for transacting value worldwide, from cryptocurrency trading to cross-border remittances. U.S. policymakers see this trend as an opportunity to entrench the dollar’s ubiquity in the emerging digital economy. 

Crucially, stablecoins allow the dollar to “preserve and promote U.S. dollar primacy on-chain” (in digital transactions) even as the dollar’s share of official foreign reserves slips modestly in the real world . In other words, while some central banks substitute gold or other currencies for a portion of their dollar reserves, the private sector and individuals globally are increasingly using dollar stablecoins as a store of value and means of exchange on digital platforms. Federal Reserve officials have explicitly recognized this dynamic. Fed Governor Christopher Waller, for instance, has argued that well-regulated stablecoins “will broaden the reach of the dollar across the globe and make it even more of a reserve currency than it is now.” He views stablecoins as a “net positive” for the U.S. payments system and a bulwark against de-dollarization, noting that it is “a lot harder to stop [the use of] stablecoins” than to confiscate physical dollar cash or gold hoards . With stablecoins, even if a nation’s banks are cut off from the Fed’s network, its citizens could theoretically still hold and transfer digital dollars (stablecoins) peer-to-peer, complicating any efforts by that nation’s authorities to shift them to an alternative currency . This view aligns with a broader doctrine that some analysts call “crypto-mercantilism” – using private crypto-dollar instruments to advance national monetary power . Under the Trump administration, this concept gained traction: Trump’s 2020 election platform and advisors hinted at leveraging cryptocurrencies (but explicitly stablecoins rather than volatile Bitcoin) to reinforce the dollar’s international role . By promoting USD stablecoins, the U.S. can resolve a seeming contradiction: maintain the dollar as the dominant reserve currency while also embracing financial innovation and decentralized tech that might normally threaten government control . In effect, the strategy co-opts the crypto revolution by filling it with dollars. 

U.S. Policy Shifts: From CBDC Skepticism to Stablecoin Support 

In early 2025, a notable divergence emerged between U.S. and European approaches to digital currency. The Atlantic Council reports that “new United States policies support dollar-backed stablecoins and oppose CBDCs,” whereas Europe takes the opposite stance – developing a digital euro while viewing private crypto assets as a stability risk . Indeed, immediately after taking office in January 2025, President Trump (in his second term) issued an Executive Order prioritizing stablecoins as the preferred means to “safeguard the global role of the U.S. dollar”, explicitly stating that the U.S. will not pursue a Federal CBDC . The order argued that CBDCs (like China’s digital yuan or even a hypothetical FedCoin) could pose financial stability threats or lead to undue government control, whereas privately issued stablecoins – if properly regulated – harness innovation while expanding dollar usage . This move formalized a policy tilt that had been brewing in Congress as well. In February 2025, a bipartisan group of U.S. senators introduced the “Genius Act” (Generating National Uniform Stablecoin Innovation?), a bill to establish a regulatory framework for large stablecoin issuers . The proposed legislation defines stablecoins as digital assets pegged to the dollar and sets prudential standards: issuers with token market value above $10 billion would be federally supervised (by the Federal Reserve), while smaller issuers could be state-regulated . The clear intent is to bring stablecoin activity onshore and under U.S. jurisdiction, rather than drive it offshore through neglect or over-regulation . By creating legal clarity, the U.S. hopes to foster trust in dollar stablecoins as fully backed, safe digital dollars that can be used globally. Treasury and Fed officials have echoed that a sound regulatory regime for stablecoins would strengthen the dollar’s appeal. Governor Waller noted that requiring stablecoin issuers to hold high-quality dollar assets 1:1 for every token (and auditing those reserves) would ensure that “good regulation of stablecoins only strengthens the dollar.” 

While the U.S. for now has shelved the idea of a Federal Reserve Digital Currency, China has raced ahead with its own CBDC. China’s digital yuan is already in use domestically and being tested for cross-border payments, including under the mBridge project with other Asian central banks . Chinese authorities have explicitly framed the digital yuan as an alternative to reliance on dollar-based stablecoins. Reports from 2024 indicate that Beijing “views U.S. dollar stablecoins as a threat” and is expanding the digital yuan’s usage to counter the influence of USD-pegged crypto tokens . This dynamic – U.S. backing of private stablecoins vs. China’s state-issued CBDC – has become a new theater of systemic competition. The U.S. likely calculates that market-driven networks (with dollar tokens) will prove more attractive globally than authoritarian-controlled digital currencies. Already, the popularity of USD stablecoins in regions like Asia and Latin America suggests a strong user preference for the dollar as a store of value outside traditional banking. For example, as of 2025 Tether’s USDT (the largest stablecoin) had a market capitalization over $140 billion, with a significant portion of trading volume concentrated in Asia . Many individuals and businesses in emerging markets use USDT or USDC as a dollar substitute to hedge inflation or facilitate commerce when access to U.S. bank accounts is limited. This organic adoption is something a top-down BRICS currency might struggle to replicate quickly. 

In parallel with promoting stablecoins, the U.S. government is leveraging its traditional strengths: the depth of U.S. capital markets and the centrality of U.S. financial infrastructure. The dollar still accounts for about 58% of global foreign exchange reserves (as of 2024), far ahead of the euro (~20%) and yuan (which remains only ~2–3%) . The U.S. is working to preserve this position by maintaining confidence in Treasury bonds and ensuring ample liquidity. Ironically, some of Trump’s other policies – large fiscal spending and tax cuts – increase U.S. deficits, meaning more Treasuries for the world to absorb. But if foreign central banks buy fewer Treasuries (as they shift to gold), private investors and institutions might fill the gap, especially if stablecoins make Treasuries more accessible (e.g., a stablecoin issuer holding T-bills for backing). Financial sanctions remain another powerful U.S. lever: the threat of losing access to the dollar system (e.g. the SWIFT network for bank messaging, or dollar clearance through New York) continues to dissuade most nations from fully breaking away. Even China, despite promoting yuan trade, still holds over $800 billion in U.S. bonds and hasn’t dumped the dollar for its core reserves. The year 2022–2023 sanctions on Russia, however, taught the U.S. a lesson: rivals will accelerate hedging strategies. Thus, Washington is now finely balancing its use of sanctions (to avoid pushing too many countries into alternative systems) with reassurance to allies and neutrals that the dollar system is reliable. The implicit deal offered is that the U.S. will modernize and improve the dollar-based network (through innovation like stablecoins and perhaps faster payment rails), making it easier and safer for others to continue using the dollar, rather than leaving to a nascent gold or yuan bloc. 

In summary, the current U.S. financial policy intentions can be seen as a two-pronged strategy: (1) Defend and extend dollar dominance by embracing stablecoins and integrating them into the regulated financial system, thereby injecting the dollar into every corner of the digital economy; and (2) Deter and counter alternative currency experiments (whether gold-based or CBDC-based) through a mix of economic statecraft (tariffs, sanctions) and by leveraging U.S. market power as a lure (“stick and carrot” approach). We now turn to a speculative exploration of how these policies might coalesce into a grand strategic arrangement in the near future, often referred to as the hypothetical “Mar-a-Lago Agreement.” 

Speculative Scenario: The “Mar-a-Lago Agreement” and a New Monetary Order 

What follows is a speculative analysis based on public statements by U.S. officials and the economic doctrines guiding them. This section outlines a possible future agreement and its features, which have not occurred but are extrapolated for discussion purposes. 

By 2026, analysts envision a potential “Mar-a-Lago Agreement”, named after former President Trump’s Florida resort, analogous to how the 1985 Plaza Accord was named for New York’s Plaza Hotel. This would be a high-profile summit where the U.S. convenes key economic partners to reshape the global monetary framework in response to China and BRICS. The structure of such an agreement might echo a neo-mercantilist Bretton Woods, aligning a coalition of like-minded nations (possibly the G7 and select others) around a U.S.-led currency strategy. President Trump – heavily influenced by the Miran Doctrine (a strategy proposed by advisor Stephen Miran that links tariffs, weak-dollar policy, and market access) – would likely use this forum to negotiate conditions under which partners can retain privileged access to U.S. markets and financial infrastructure. In essence, the Mar-a-Lago Agreement would formalize a new grand bargain: countries in the U.S. camp commit to using dollar-based stablecoins or the dollar itself for international settlements, rather than any gold-backed or Sino-centric currency, and in return the U.S. guarantees open access to its domestic market and dollar liquidity facilities. Conversely, nations that join alternative currency arrangements (like a hypothetical BRICS gold token) could be penalized with punitive tariffs, quotas, or financial sanctions. Trump’s warning of “100% tariffs” on BRICS if they introduce a new currency would form the hardline backdrop to these negotiations – a stick to drive countries towards the carrot of the U.S.-led system. 

A key component of the Mar-a-Lago framework would be treating stablecoins as the de facto reserve medium within the bloc, effectively substituting for physical gold or rival digital currencies in clearing trades. The agreement might endorse one or several U.S. dollar stablecoins (fully regulated under U.S. law) as acceptable for interbank and cross-border payments among signatories. For example, a consortium of financial institutions could be formed to issue a “TradeStable USD” token, 100% backed by short-term U.S. Treasury bills, that would be used for settling trade accounts between member countries. This would parallel how gold or dollar balances were used under Bretton Woods, but with modern technology: instead of shipping gold or waiting for wire transfers, countries would swap stablecoin tokens on a blockchain, with the assurance that those tokens are as good as dollars. Such a system could be appealing to many emerging markets who desire a stable unit for trade but lack their own reserve currency – it offers the stability of the dollar without requiring a direct U.S. central bank digital currency. Importantly, it keeps the U.S. dollar at the center: all tokens would ultimately be redeemable in dollars. To address concerns of volatility or loss of confidence, the agreement could establish a Stability Board (perhaps under the IMF’s umbrella) to monitor the reserve backing and governance of the major stablecoin issuers. In effect, this would create a digital Bretton Woods, where the dollar (in tokenized form) remains the anchor, and periodic multilateral coordination is used to manage any imbalances or crises. 

Another element would be exchange rate realignments targeted at major economies in the bloc. Just as the Plaza Accord coordinated a dollar depreciation, the Mar-a-Lago Agreement might coordinate moderate adjustments to ensure that no ally’s currency is grossly over- or undervalued against the dollar. Trump has long accused countries like Germany, Japan (and of course China) of benefiting from weak currencies. Under a second Trump administration, U.S. policy might actively seek a slightly weaker dollar (to boost U.S. exports), but only within a controlled framework where partners share the burden. For instance, countries with large trade surpluses with the U.S. (e.g. Germany, Japan, perhaps even Vietnam or Mexico) could agree to appreciate their currencies or allow higher inflation, while the U.S. promises not to impose tariffs on them. This would echo the Plaza Accord’s goals but with a twist: it would be enforcement-oriented, possibly tied to measurable trade balance targets. Trump’s team could resurrect something akin to the 1980s idea of “Managed Trade” – if a country’s surplus with the U.S. exceeds a threshold, automatic currency or policy adjustments kick in. By binding this into an international agreement, the administration would aim to avoid constant ad-hoc tariff fights and instead have a rules-based system favorable to U.S. interests. 

Critically, the Mar-a-Lago Agreement would also delineate the geopolitical lines of the financial system. Signatories (likely including North America, much of Europe, Japan, Korea, maybe certain Middle East partners) would be expected to limit their participation in any BRICS or Chinese alternative mechanisms. For example, they might agree not to adopt the digital yuan for reserves, not to join a BRICS payment network, and not to increase official gold holdings beyond a certain share (to discourage movement out of dollars). In return, the U.S. might agree to reforms in global institutions giving these allies more voice (to reassure them this is a cooperative venture, not one-sided). Access to U.S. markets and financial infrastructure becomes explicitly conditional on alignment with this U.S.-led monetary order. This is essentially formalizing a financial NATO of sorts – an economic Article 5 that an attack on the dollar by currency diversification is seen as an unfriendly act. Countries sitting on the fence, especially in Europe, would face a stark choice: remain in the dollar zone with all its privileges, or drift toward the yuan/gold zone and risk losing the American connection that has underpinned their security and prosperity. 

This speculative agreement is dubbed “Mar-a-Lago” not only for venue, but to signal a personal diplomacy style. Trump would likely host heads of state in a highly publicized summit to cut this deal, leveraging personal rapport and bravado. The outcome could be announced as a “new Bretton Woods for a new era”. Supporters would argue it ensures continued global stability under U.S. leadership, harnessing innovation (stablecoins) while preventing fragmentation into competing currency blocs. Detractors might warn it formalizes a dangerous economic bifurcation of the world – a U.S. sphere and a Sino-Russian sphere – potentially forcing neutral countries into difficult positions. 

Implications for Europe and the Transatlantic Alliance 

For Europe, the advent of such U.S. policies presents both challenges and critical decisions. Historically, Europe (especially the eurozone nations) has benefited from the U.S.-led financial order while also occasionally chafing under it. European Union leaders have at times called for “strategic autonomy” in finance – for instance, establishing the euro as a second global reserve currency or creating independent payment channels (as Europe attempted with the INSTEX mechanism to trade with Iran outside of U.S. sanctions). However, the reality is that the European economy remains deeply intertwined with the U.S. dollar system. As ECB President Christine Lagarde noted, as of 2025 roughly 17% of the EU’s exports go to the United States, and a similarly significant share of services and capital flows link the two economies . The U.S. and EU trade balance is roughly even in aggregate, but Europe runs surpluses in goods while the U.S. runs surpluses in services . This mutual interdependence means any disruption in transatlantic trade or finance would hurt both sides, but arguably Europe (with generally slower growth and higher export dependence) could be hurt more. 

If the U.S. were to make access to its market and financial infrastructure contingent on political alignment, Europe would be under intense pressure to align with Washington’s monetary strategy vis-à-vis China. In practical terms, this could mean: European banks and companies would be expected not to use a potential BRICS gold-backed currency for transactions; European central banks might be discouraged from increasing their renminbi reserves or participating in Chinese payment networks; and the EU might be asked to coordinate with U.S. sanctions or tariffs related to currency issues. The cost of non-compliance could be loss of access to U.S. financial services – for example, in a worst case, European banks could conceivably be barred from dollar clearing if their host nations joined a rival bloc. While such extreme measures are unlikely between close allies, the implicit threat may suffice. European officials are already “paying special attention” to U.S. crypto and stablecoin policy developments, recognizing their global significance . In a March 2025 hearing, President Lagarde acknowledged that Europe must monitor the legal framework the U.S. puts around stablecoins and crypto, because these will affect financial stability and the role of the euro . Europe’s own approach has been to pursue a digital euro (CBDC) and comprehensive crypto regulations (via the MiCA regulation) to ensure stability. If the U.S. moves in the opposite direction – favoring private dollar tokens and explicitly disavowing a digital euro-style CBDC – transatlantic differences could emerge. European regulators worry that wide usage of USD stablecoins (potentially under U.S. oversight but outside European control) in their economies could diminish the euro’s monetary sovereignty or even create financial risks. For instance, if a dollar stablecoin became widely used in Eastern Europe or Italy, the ECB could find its monetary policy transmission weakened (similar to widespread unofficial “dollarization”). Thus, Europe may respond by accelerating its digital euro project to offer a home-grown alternative for digital payments. Yet a digital euro would primarily serve within the eurozone; it is not obvious that it could compete with global dollar stablecoins in third countries. 

Another European concern is being squeezed between the U.S. and China. The EU has significant trade with China (for Germany, China is a top export market). If the world splits into two currency camps, Europe will attempt to maintain economic links with both – a delicate balancing act. Some European leaders, like France’s President Emmanuel Macron, have suggested Europe should not be “vassal” to either Washington or Beijing, but chart its own course. In a scenario where the U.S. ties market access to alignment, Europe might seek middle-ground: cooperating with the U.S. on core financial alignment (staying with the dollar system for reserves and major transactions) while engaging economically with China to the extent possible in euros or yuan for specific deals. However, the feasibility of true non-alignment is limited. The experience of EU companies during past U.S. sanctions on Iran showed that when forced to choose, they could not afford to lose access to U.S. markets and banks, and thus mostly complied with U.S. directives despite the EU’s political objections. A similar dynamic could play out on the currency issue. Europe might rhetorically support a multipolar monetary world, but in practice the euro will likely remain closer to the dollar bloc. The transatlantic alliance (through NATO and shared values) also inclines Europe to side with the U.S. in any systemic rivalry with authoritarian powers. 

Economically, if the U.S. implements a neo-Plaza Accord type policy and perhaps allows the dollar to weaken somewhat against European currencies, this could actually benefit Europe’s exporters (their goods become relatively more expensive to Americans if the euro appreciates). However, Europe might not welcome a sharply stronger euro, as it could hurt its own growth. Therefore, European policymakers would want a say in any coordinated exchange rate plans. They may insist that any “Mar-a-Lago” style accord include the ECB at the table to manage euro-dollar adjustments in a way that doesn’t unduly harm Eurozone industry. In terms of gold reserves, major European central banks (Germany, Italy, France) already hold large gold stocks from pre-euro days. They have not been buyers in recent years (Europe was selling in the 1990s, then stopped around 2008) . Under a U.S.-aligned strategy, Europe might keep its gold constant or even lend some of it to the U.S. stablecoin system as collateral, rather than joining emerging markets in new purchases. 

Overall, Europe stands to be caught in a geopolitical crossfire. If it aligns fully with the U.S. financial strategy, it preserves its privileged access but could lose some flexibility in dealing with China and the broader global south. If it tries to stay neutral or push the euro as an independent pole, it risks isolation or punitive measures from the U.S. (in the extreme scenario of a transatlantic rift). The likely outcome is that Europe will align with the U.S. on the fundamental question of keeping the dollar-centric system intact – it has much to lose if that system fragments. But Europe will also work to hedge its bets: proceeding with the digital euro to have its own capability, engaging in dialogue with China to avoid a hard economic break, and advocating within the U.S.-led coalition for a multilateral approach rather than a purely America-first dictate. European diplomats may, for instance, push for the IMF or G20 to be the venues for any big monetary agreements (to dilute the bilateral pressure). The ECB and Bank of England might coordinate with the Fed on stablecoin oversight, ensuring that if dollar stablecoins circulate in Europe, they meet standards that the ECB is comfortable with (perhaps even swap lines to provide liquidity to those stablecoins in a crisis). 

In conclusion, Europe will seek to maintain unity with the U.S. while preserving some autonomy. The success of U.S. strategies in countering China’s monetary ambitions will partly hinge on European cooperation. If Europe were to break away and join a new system (which is unlikely barring a major political shift), the dollar’s dominance would truly be in peril. But if Europe stays allied, the Western bloc controlling the bulk of global GDP would likely keep the dollar (and euro) as the central pillars of global finance, containing China’s influence to a more regional sphere. Thus, European alignment is the linchpin of U.S. hopes to isolate the BRICS currency push and uphold a unified front. The next few years will reveal whether Europe finds the U.S. vision – of stablecoins and conditional access – acceptable, and how it balances principle with pragmatism in a bifurcating monetary order. 

The evolving contest between the United States and China for economic preeminence is increasingly extending into the realm of currencies and digital money. This article has traced the deep historical roots of U.S. financial policy – from 19th-century protectionism and the gold standard, through the creation of the Bretton Woods dollar system, to the transition to fiat currency and past episodes of international monetary coordination. That history demonstrates a consistent theme: U.S. policy adapts pragmatically to sustain American economic leadership, whether by redesigning the global system (as in 1944 and 1971) or by striking targeted deals (as in 1985) or, more recently, by exploring cutting-edge financial technology. Today, the U.S. faces perhaps its greatest test since the 1940s, as China’s rise and the assertiveness of BRICS economies challenge the dollar-centric status quo. In response, Washington’s strategy appears to be coalescing around leveraging America’s financial innovation and market power. By embracing USD-pegged stablecoins – effectively enlisting private crypto innovation in service of public monetary dominance – the U.S. is attempting to chart a third path between clinging to old mechanisms (like physical gold convertibility) and adopting a state-run digital currency that might stifle innovation. This approach seeks to flood the world with easily usable digital dollars, outcompeting any rival currency through network effects and convenience, while still maintaining regulatory oversight and the full faith and credit behind those dollars. 

The speculative notion of a “Mar-a-Lago Agreement” captures how these threads might be woven into a grand strategy: combining currency agreements, digital token infrastructure, and selective protectionism to ring-fence a U.S.-led economic order. Whether such an agreement materializes exactly as imagined is uncertain – history rarely unfolds in a straight line. But the signals are clear that the U.S. is prepared to use all tools at its disposal – tariffs, treaties, tech, and trust – to counter a drift toward a multipolar currency world. The costs and risks are not negligible. Weaponizing access to markets can strain alliances. Relying on a few private stablecoin issuers to uphold global liquidity requires robust safeguards against instability or abuse. Nevertheless, from Washington’s perspective, the alternative – a world where a significant share of trade and reserves pivots to a Chinese or BRICS standard – is unacceptable. 

For U.S. allies and the broader international community, these developments force critical choices. Europe in particular must navigate aligning with its longtime partner’s goals while securing its own interests. Many countries in the global south will watch closely and weigh benefits: a stable dollar system with modernized access via stablecoins could be attractive, but some may resent the conditionality or lack of voice. Institutions like the IMF and G20 will likely become arenas of debate over these issues, possibly updating their roles (for instance, IMF oversight of stablecoin reserves or new swap facilities to emerging markets). 

In the end, the contest between a stablecoin-enhanced Dollar and a gold-tinged Yuan/BRICS alternative may define international finance for the coming decade. If the U.S. strategy succeeds, the dollar could retain its dominance well into the 21st century, albeit in new digital form – fulfilling the adage that the dollar adjusts and survives. If it fails, the global system could transition to a more pluralistic reserve configuration, with greater regionalization (Asia under a RMB sphere, others trading in various units) and gold regaining a formal role not seen in fifty years. The stakes are enormous, and both history and innovation will serve as guides. As of 2025, the United States is making clear it does not intend to cede the “exorbitant privilege” of its currency – instead, it plans to reinvent that privilege for the digital age, in a direct strategic response to China’s economic ascent and the allure of gold. 

Sources: 

• U.S. historical tariff and monetary policy: McKinley Tariff (1890) and gold standard debates ; Great Depression trade collapse ; Bretton Woods agreements ; Nixon ending gold convertibility in 1971 ; Plaza Accord and dollar depreciation . 
• Presidential influences: Rubin’s strong-dollar mantra in the 1990s ; Trump’s “crypto-mercantilism” promoting USD stablecoins ; Trump’s threat of 100% tariffs on BRICS over a new currency . 
• China/BRICS and gold: Record central bank gold buying over 1,000t annually since 2022 , driven by desire to diversify from the dollar ; BRICS discussions on gold-backed currency and de-dollarization efforts . 
• U.S. current policy intentions: Fed Governor Waller supporting stablecoins to bolster the dollar’s reserve status ; Atlantic Council noting Trump’s 2025 executive order favoring stablecoins over CBDC ; rapid growth and usage of USD stablecoins worldwide . 
• European perspective: Lagarde’s remarks on watching U.S. stablecoin legislation (Genius Act) and need to monitor U.S. crypto moves ; trade dependence between EU and U.S. . 
• All data and quotations are drawn from U.S. government publications, international financial institution reports, academic analyses, and leading media coverage

Catalogue of Major U.S. Presidential Decisions Relevant to the Article 

1. The Coinage Act of 1873 — President Ulysses S. Grant 

• → Formal demonetisation of silver and anchoring the U.S. monetary system exclusively to gold (the so-called “Crime of 1873”). 
• Relevance: Foundation of U.S. gold standard orthodoxy and hard money policy. 

2. The Gold Standard Act of 1900 — President William McKinley 

• → Legal fixation of the U.S. Dollar to gold at $20.67 per ounce. 
• Relevance: The zenith of 19th-century U.S. monetary gold orthodoxy; defining the U.S. as a gold-standard nation. 

3. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 — President Herbert Hoover 

• → Massive increase of U.S. tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods. 
• Relevance: Triggered retaliatory tariffs globally; accelerated the collapse of global trade; widely blamed for exacerbating the Great Depression. 

4. Executive Order 6102 of 1933 — President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

• → Confiscation of private gold from U.S. citizens and prohibition of private gold ownership. 
• Relevance: Decoupling domestic monetary policy from gold constraints to enable currency devaluation. 

5. The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 — President Franklin D. Roosevelt 

• → Devaluation of the U.S. Dollar against gold from $20.67 to $35 per ounce. 
• Relevance: Strengthened U.S. gold reserves and export competitiveness during the Great Depression. 

6. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945 — President Harry S. Truman 

• → Formal implementation of the Bretton Woods System (pegged currencies to the dollar, which was convertible to gold). 
• Relevance: Established the U.S. Dollar as the global reserve currency. 

7. The Nixon Shock of 1971 — President Richard Nixon 

• → Suspension of Dollar convertibility into gold (August 15, 1971). 
• Relevance: End of the Bretton Woods system; beginning of global fiat currency regime. 

8. The Smithsonian Agreement of 1971 — President Richard Nixon 

• → Attempted realignment of exchange rates post-gold standard. 
• Relevance: Short-lived arrangement failing to restore fixed exchange stability. 

9. The Plaza Accord of 1985 — President Ronald Reagan 

• → Coordinated depreciation of the overvalued U.S. Dollar against the Japanese Yen and German Deutsche Mark. 
• Relevance: Managed trade imbalances and supported U.S. export competitiveness. 

10. The Louvre Accord of 1987 — President Ronald Reagan 

• → Stabilisation pact following the sharp depreciation of the Dollar post-Plaza Accord. 
• Relevance: Early experiment in coordinated currency stabilisation post-gold standard. 

11. Executive Sanctions Strategy (2018–2020) — President Donald J. Trump 

• → Weaponisation of the Dollar system (e.g., against Iran, Venezuela, and threat of sanctions on China over currency practices). 
• Relevance: Strategic use of financial infrastructure control for geopolitical leverage. 

12. Phase One Trade Agreement with China (2020) — President Donald J. Trump 

• → Forced Chinese commitments to buy U.S. goods and avoid currency manipulation. 
• Relevance: Codified Trump’s mercantilist approach towards China. 

13. Executive Order Prohibiting CBDC Development (2025) — President Donald J. Trump (second term, speculative but anticipated) 

• → Formal rejection of a Federal Reserve-issued CBDC; explicit strategic preference for private USD-backed stablecoins. 
• Relevance: Clear positioning of the U.S. towards decentralised dollar instruments over state-issued digital currency. 

14. Proposed “Mar-a-Lago Accord” (2025–2026) — President Donald J. Trump (hypothetical and speculative) 

• → Strategic international financial framework tying access to the U.S. market and financial system to the use of U.S.-regulated stablecoins, prohibiting participation in BRICS gold-backed or yuan-based alternatives. 
• Relevance: The logical culmination of a new U.S. grand strategy leveraging stablecoins to preserve Dollar hegemony against China’s financial rise. 

15. Executive Order on Stablecoin Integration — President Donald J. Trump (2025) 

• → Mandate for Federal Agencies: Directed federal agencies to integrate U.S.-regulated stablecoins into government payment systems and cross-border transactions. 
• → Objective: To solidify the U.S. dollar’s dominance in the global digital economy and provide a countermeasure to China’s digital yuan initiatives. 

 
16. Introduction of the GENIUS Act — U.S. Senate (2025) 

• → Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act: A bipartisan bill establishing a regulatory framework for the issuance and operation of stablecoins in the United States. 
• → Key Provisions: Includes requirements for reserve holdings, operational transparency, and compliance with anti-money laundering regulations. 

 
17. Introduction of the STABLE Act — U.S. House of Representatives (2025) 

• → Stablecoin Transparency and Accountability for a Better Ledger Economy Act: Companion legislation to the GENIUS Act, focusing on consumer protections and oversight mechanisms for stablecoin issuers. 
• → Emphasis: Ensures that stablecoins are backed by U.S. dollar reserves and that issuers are subject to federal supervision. 

 
18. Formation of the “Digital Dollar Partnership” — President Donald J. Trump (2025) 

• → Coalition Building: Initiated a partnership among allied nations to adopt U.S.-backed stablecoins for international trade and finance. 
• → Strategic Aim: To create a Western bloc financial system that reduces reliance on traditional banking infrastructures and counters China’s Belt and Road financial mechanisms. 

 
19. Implementation of Tariffs on BRICS Nations — President Donald J. Trump (2025) 

• → Tariff Measures: Imposed tariffs up to 145% on imports from BRICS countries, particularly targeting China, as a response to their efforts in developing alternative reserve currencies. 
• → Purpose: To discourage de-dollarization and maintain the U.S. dollar’s central role in global trade. 

 
20. Executive Directive on Federal Reserve Digital Currency — President Donald J. Trump (2025) 

• → Policy Stance: Opposed the development of a Federal Reserve-issued Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), favoring private sector-led stablecoin solutions. 
• → Rationale: Belief that private stablecoins offer more innovation and flexibility compared to a government-issued digital currency. 

 
21. Launch of “World Liberty Financial” Stablecoin — Trump-affiliated Initiative (2025) 

• → Private Sector Engagement: A Trump-affiliated company introduced a U.S. dollar-backed stablecoin aimed at facilitating international trade and strengthening the dollar’s digital presence. 
• → Controversy: Raised concerns over potential conflicts of interest and the intertwining of private ventures with national monetary policy. 

 
22. Advocacy for Interest-Bearing Stablecoins — Crypto Executives and Legislators (2025) 

• → Proposal: Suggested allowing stablecoins to offer interest to holders, enhancing their attractiveness as financial instruments. 
• → Debate: Sparked discussions on the implications for traditional banking systems and monetary policy. 

 
23. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Engagement Strategy — U.S. Treasury Department (2025) 

• → Policy Direction: Utilized the IMF to support countries aligning with U.S. financial initiatives, including the adoption of U.S.-backed stablecoins. 
• → Strategic Goal: To reinforce the U.S. dollar’s global influence and counteract the financial outreach of rival nations. 

 
24. Public Statements on BRICS Currency Initiatives — President Donald J. Trump (2025) 

• → Position: Dismissed BRICS efforts to develop an alternative reserve currency, labeling such initiatives as threats to U.S. economic security. 
• → Policy Implication: Signaled a hardline stance against any moves perceived to undermine the U.S. dollar’s supremacy.