A critical assessment about Propaganda surrounding the e-CNY

Introduction 

China’s digital renminbi (RMB) – also known as the digital yuan or e-CNY – has been touted as a transformative force in cross-border finance. In early 2025, various commentators and media reports claimed that the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) had made significant strides in linking the digital RMB to international partners, potentially challenging the U.S. dollar’s dominance. These reports included striking statistics: an alleged PBoC announcement connecting the digital RMB cross-border system with numerous Asian and Middle Eastern countries, purportedly covering 38% of global trade and bypassing SWIFT; dramatic improvements in payment speed (from days to seconds) and cost (98% fee reduction) demonstrated in Hong Kong–Abu Dhabi tests; “100-fold” efficiency gains in a China–Indonesia pilot; 23 central banks joining trials and 75% cost savings for Middle East energy traders; surging RMB trade settlement volumes with ASEAN (¥5.8 trillion in 2024) alongside new oil trades settled in RMB and increased RMB in foreign reserves; integration of the digital RMB with China’s Belt and Road infrastructure (including Beidou satellites and quantum communication) with claims of 400% efficiency boosts on Arctic shipping routes; and finally, assertions that 87% of countries have adapted to this system, facilitating over $1.2 trillion in cross-border payments across 200 countries. Such claims, if true, would signal a seismic shift in global finance. 

In this report, we critically fact-check each of these claims against credible sources – including data from the PBoC, international financial institutions (BIS, IMF), SWIFT, and authoritative news outlets – to assess their accuracy. 

PBoC’s Announcement: Digital RMB Cross-Border System with ASEAN and Middle Eastern Countries 

Claim: “The People’s Bank of China announced that its digital RMB cross-border settlement system is now fully connected to ten ASEAN nations and six Middle Eastern countries.” This was reported as a groundbreaking announcement on March 17, 2025, implying China has established a cross-border digital currency network spanning much of Southeast Asia and the Middle East. 

Fact-check & Analysis: Official confirmation of this exact announcement is elusive. Multiple secondary sources (economic blogs and social media summaries) attribute the claim to a PBoC announcement on that date, but no corresponding press release on the PBoC’s website or major newswire (e.g. Reuters, Bloomberg) has been found. It is plausible that PBoC officials or a report did state an intention or progress to connect the e-CNY system with those regions – China has indeed been testing cross-border CBDC usage with partners in ASEAN and the Gulf. For example, since 2022 China has trialed the digital yuan with Hong Kong, Thailand, and the UAE, and by late 2024 China was conducting a new pilot involving Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among others. These pilots are part of the BIS “mBridge” project and other multilateral efforts to enable CBDC interoperability. 

However, describing the system as “fully connected” to all ten ASEAN countries and six unspecified Middle Eastern nations appears exaggerated. If taken literally, it suggests that nearly the entire ASEAN bloc and multiple major Mideast economies are actively linked to China’s digital currency network. In reality, by 2025 many of these countries were exploring or observing CBDC projects, but not necessarily fully integrated into a Chinese system. For instance, Singapore’s central bank (MAS) had an agreement with PBoC for tourist use of e-CNY and was observing cross-border trials, but Singapore was not formally part of the mBridge network as of late 2023. Similarly, Saudi Arabia only joined pilot discussions in late 2024. No official list of the “six Middle Eastern nations” was given in reports; likely candidates are the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly others involved in China’s Belt and Road agreements or bilateral currency swaps. 

In summary, no direct PBoC statement corroborated by primary sources explicitly lists “10 ASEAN and 6 Middle Eastern” connections as of March 2025. The claim seems to originate from commentary amplifying China’s ambitions. It should be viewed with caution: China was certainly expanding e-CNY trials internationally, but portraying it as a done deal with those 16 countries goes beyond documented facts. It may reflect a forward-looking scenario or informal understanding rather than a fully operational network acknowledged by all parties. 

“38% of Global Trade” Bypassing SWIFT – Scope of Integration 

Claim: “This integration (with ASEAN and Middle East) covers 38% of global trade volume and bypasses the US-dominated SWIFT system.” In other words, if China’s digital RMB network links those countries, over a third of world trade could ostensibly transact outside of SWIFT’s dollar-based messaging network. 

Fact-check & Analysis: The figure 38% appears to be an analytical extrapolation, not an official metric declared by the PBoC. It likely comes from adding the share of global trade accounted for by China, ASEAN, and key Middle Eastern economies. Indeed, China alone contributes roughly 15% of global merchandise exports, ASEAN as a bloc contributes around 7–8%, and major Middle Eastern oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, etc.) add a significant chunk. Summing these could approach 30–40% of global trade. The commentary suggests that if these economies transact through a digital RMB network, that portion of trade would “bypass SWIFT”, reducing reliance on the dollar clearing system. 

However, no international body has confirmed that 38% of global trade is now actually bypassing SWIFT. This is a theoretical maximum assuming all trade between those nations is settled in RMB via the new system. In practice, while RMB usage in trade has grown, the majority of ASEAN and Middle East trade is still invoiced in dollars or other major currencies. SWIFT (the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) remains deeply entrenched in international payments. As of early 2025, the RMB’s share of global payments was only about 2–3% by value (per SWIFT’s currency tracker) and its share in trade finance was under 5%. Thus, 38% refers to the potential coverage of those economies, not the actual share of world trade currently settled in RMB or through China’s networks. 

Moreover, SWIFT vs. digital RMB is not a direct one-to-one comparison: SWIFT is a messaging system used by banks worldwide (including Chinese banks) to route payments, whereas the digital RMB network involves currency issuance and distributed ledger settlement. Indeed, transactions on a CBDC network would not require SWIFT messages – they would use a different infrastructure altogether – effectively “bypassing” SWIFT for those payments. But to claim nearly 40% of global trade volume will immediately do so is speculative. Even Chinese sources frame this as a future scenario “when the system is fully connected”, implying it is aspirational. 

In summary, 38% of global trade is an upper-bound estimate of the trade share of countries that could use the digital RMB network. It should not be read as an accomplished fact. No official institution (IMF, BIS, WTO) has verified such a figure about RMB-based settlement. The claim highlights the strategic scope of China’s CBDC outreach but likely overstates the immediate reality. Bypassing SWIFT is feasible on a technical level for those participants, but broad adoption on that scale has not yet occurred by 2025, and the claim remains unsubstantiated by trade data. 

SWIFT’s 3–5 Day Delays vs Digital RMB’s 7-Second Settlements (Hong Kong–Abu Dhabi Test) 

Claim: “SWIFT transactions take 3–5 days, whereas a digital RMB cross-border payment can settle in ~7 seconds. In a Hong Kong–Abu Dhabi pilot test, a supplier payment was settled in real-time, eliminating six intermediary banks and achieving a 98% reduction in fees.” This paints a picture of astonishing speed and cost efficiency for the digital yuan network compared to the legacy system. 

Fact-check & Analysis: It is accurate that traditional cross-border payments using the correspondent banking model (often facilitated by SWIFT messages) are slow – typically requiring 3–5 days to clear, sometimes longer. Each transfer can pass through multiple correspondent banks (intermediaries) which add processing time and fees. This inefficiency is well-documented: according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), international payments can indeed take several days and involve high costs due to convoluted routes and compliance checks. SWIFT itself is not a settlement system but a secure messaging platform; the actual money movement relies on banks’ ledgers and correspondent relationships, hence the delays. 

By contrast, central bank digital currency (CBDC) prototypes have demonstrated much faster cross-border settlements. The BIS conducted a pilot (Project mBridge) with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Thailand, PBoC, and UAE in 2021, which showed that cross-border CBDC payments could be completed in a few seconds instead of days. This aligns with the “7-second” figure often cited by Chinese sources as a benchmark for the digital RMB’s performance. A PBoC deputy governor noted that using blockchain-based CBDCs can allow near-instant payment completion. Thus, the speed claim (3–5 days vs seconds) is supported by empirical trials. 

The Hong Kong–Abu Dhabi test described is likely referencing a specific transaction carried out under the mBridge pilot or a similar bilateral trial. Reports claim a Chinese company in Hong Kong paid a Middle Eastern (Abu Dhabi) supplier in digital RMB, and the payment settled almost instantaneously. Because it occurred on a distributed ledger linking the two jurisdictions, the transfer did not need to hop through correspondent banks – hence “eliminating six intermediary banks” in that anecdote. While the precise number of intermediary banks will vary by transaction, many cross-border payments indeed involve a chain of intermediary institutions. Removing these intermediaries not only speeds up settlement but also cuts fees dramatically, since each bank in the chain takes a fee. 

The claim of a 98% reduction in handling fees is dramatic, but not implausible in an ideal scenario. If, for example, a small international payment incurred cumulative fees of, say, 5% under the old system (spread among several banks taking cuts), reducing that to near-zero through direct CBDC transfer would be a 98%+ fee reduction. However, BIS analyses have been more conservative: the BIS report on the pilot found cost savings of up to ~50% in cross-border payments using CBDCs. This 50% figure accounts for eliminating some FX costs and liquidity needs, but not necessarily all bank fees. The 98% figure likely comes from a specific use-case calculation in the Hong Kong–UAE trial, perhaps for a payment that would have been particularly expensive via correspondent banking. Without the full data, we should treat the exact percentage as anecdotal. 

Crucially, the Hong Kong–Abu Dhabi real-time payment example is credible as a demonstration. The BIS Innovation Hub has confirmed that multi-CBDC platforms can achieve near-real-time settlement and significantly lower costs for participants. Hong Kong’s Central Bank (HKMA) and the Central Bank of UAE have been at the forefront of these tests. In late 2022, they completed a pilot of 160 payments totaling $22 million on the mBridge platform, with average transaction times of seconds (and the limiting factor being user interface, not ledger speed) – although specific details of fee reduction in that pilot were not widely published in the press. The claim as presented in the passage appears to combine known general benefits (seconds vs days, fewer intermediaries) with a particular case study (the HK–Abu Dhabi payment). While the broad point is accurate – digital currency systems are much faster and cheaper than SWIFT routes – the exact “7 seconds” and “98% fee reduction” should be viewed as illustrative, based on an internal test scenario rather than a standardized outcome for all transactions. 

In summary, SWIFT’s latency (days) versus digital RMB’s speed (seconds) is well-founded, and a Hong Kong–UAE trial did show near-instant, low-cost settlement. The key is that these results come from controlled pilots. Real-world scalability and whether this will be adopted for large volumes of trade remain open questions. But as a proof of concept, the claim stands on solid ground: CBDC networks can indeed vastly outperform the traditional correspondent banking network in speed and potential cost. 

Transaction Costs and Efficiency: 98% Fee Reduction & “100-Fold” Improvement (China–Indonesia Pilot) 

Claim: “Digital RMB reduces handling fees by 98%, and a payment in China–Indonesia ‘Two Countries, Two Parks’ project cleared in 8 seconds – 100 times more efficient than conventional methods.” The passage also notes that blockchain automation makes every transaction traceable with built-in anti-money laundering compliance. 

Fact-check & Analysis: We have partly addressed the 98% fee reduction above – it likely refers to the elimination of correspondent banking fees in specific test transactions. To reiterate, while conventional cross-border wires can incur multiple percent in fees, a direct central bank wallet-to-wallet payment can cut most of those out. A 98% decrease suggests, for example, going from a $100 fee down to $2. Such a reduction, though extreme, might occur in a scenario where a payment that used to route through many banks (each charging a fee) is replaced by a single-step transfer. This figure should be taken as an upper bound. More common projections, as noted, are on the order of 50% cost savings for typical cases. It’s worth noting that transaction fees on a digital currency platform could be near-zero for the central banks, though banks might eventually add small fees for customers. 

The “Two Countries, Two Parks” project refers to a bilateral economic initiative between China and Indonesia (specifically, industrial parks cooperation). In this context, the Industrial Bank of China reportedly executed the first cross-border payment using digital RMB for this project in a mere 8 seconds. This was touted in Chinese media as a breakthrough demonstration. If 8 seconds is “100 times more efficient” than the traditional process, the comparison might assume that a similar cross-border payment through normal banking channels would take on the order of 800 seconds (about 13 minutes) – or perhaps it refers loosely to overall procedural efficiency rather than literal time. It’s not entirely clear how they quantify “100× more efficient,” but the spirit is that what used to take minutes or hours was done in seconds. Given that traditional international transfers can even take hours or days to confirm, the order-of-magnitude improvement claim is believable. In digital systems, settlement time drops from days to seconds, which is indeed a difference by a factor of thousands (e.g., 3 days = ~259,200 seconds, versus 8 seconds). Even compared to a faster method (say an hour via some expedited route = 3600 seconds), 8 seconds is hundreds of times faster. So “100-fold” is a rounded metric to emphasize scale, and it is not outlandish in context. 

What’s key here is that Industrial Bank’s pilot is a concrete example of China using the e-CNY for an actual cross-border commerce scenario (investment in a joint industrial park). This indicates the technology is not just theoretical: Chinese banks are actively implementing pilot transactions with willing partners. The claim underscores automation and compliance: because the digital RMB runs on a controlled blockchain, things like anti-money laundering (AML) checks and traceability are built in. This is plausible – smart contract features or simply the transparent ledger can indeed ensure all transactions are recorded and potentially subject to automatic checks. PBoC officials have stated that the digital yuan’s platform automatically enforces certain compliance rules, unlike cash or even normal electronic transfers. From an accuracy standpoint, it’s fair to say the digital RMB system improves monitoring and compliance (though how automatic AML enforcement is remains to be seen; it likely still requires oversight). 

In evaluating the reliability of the 98% fee reduction and 100× efficiency claims, it’s clear these are best-case outcomes reported by Chinese sources. Authoritative institutions (BIS, IMF) acknowledge significant improvements with CBDCs but typically give more conservative estimates (50-90% time reduction, ~50% cost reduction). No independent audit of the “Two Parks” transaction details has been published, so we rely on the Chinese bank’s account. Nonetheless, there is no evidence contradicting the technical possibility of these gains. We should interpret “100 times more efficient” as promotional language highlighting that processes that used to be laborious can now be instantaneous. 

In conclusion, the digital RMB’s ability to dramatically cut costs and increase efficiency in cross-border payments is supported by pilot studies, though the precise figures (98% fee reduction, 100× faster) come from case-specific reports. They are likely accurate for that case, but real-world averages may be less extreme. The claim is indicative of real advantages, if not a blanket guarantee of those exact numbers for every transaction. 

Adoption by Central Banks and Traders: 23 Central Banks Testing, 75% Cost Savings for Middle Eastern Energy Traders 

Claim: “23 central banks worldwide are actively participating in China’s digital currency bridge tests, and Middle Eastern energy traders have reduced settlement costs by 75% using the digital RMB.” This suggests broad interest by central banks and significant cost benefits realized in the oil & gas trade. 

Fact-check & Analysis: The number “23 central banks” aligns with information from the BIS and other sources about international interest in multi-CBDC platforms. In late 2023, the BIS reported that 23 central banks were observing or involved in the mBridge project (the cross-border CBDC pilot led by BIS and co-run with China). Specifically, while only a handful of central banks (China, Hong Kong, Thailand, UAE, etc.) were direct participants, many others joined as observers to learn from the project. Ledger Insights (a reputable fintech news site) noted that “23 central banks” had eyes on the mBridge initiative, although, for example, Singapore was not among them at that time. This indicates a widespread institutional interest. Additionally, beyond mBridge, China’s Digital Currency Research Institute has signed MOUs or engaged in discussions with many central banks in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East about interoperability – which could plausibly sum up to a few dozen. Therefore, the claim of 23 central banks testing or trialing the system is credible. It likely includes not just direct pilots but also sandbox collaborations and observer roles in BIS-led tests. (For context, there are about ~120 central banks globally, so 23 would be roughly one-fifth; this is believable given that, according to an Atlantic Council tracker, over 100 countries are exploring CBDCs in general by 2025, and China’s project is one of the leading efforts in the wholesale domain.) 

The Middle Eastern energy traders cutting settlement costs by 75% is a more specific claim and appears to derive from anecdotal evidence or statements by those involved in pilot transactions. Middle Eastern oil and gas exporters (for instance, companies in the Gulf states) often receive payments in USD and face certain bank charges and currency conversion costs. If instead an oil cargo sale is settled directly in RMB via a digital platform, fees related to USD wire transfers and currency conversion might be largely eliminated. A 75% cost reduction could refer to savings in transaction and hedging costs for those traders. While we don’t have an independent source quantifying 75%, this claim likely came from Chinese reports of early adopters’ feedback. For example, the African Property Magazine article (which is based on Chinese sources) explicitly states “Middle Eastern energy traders have reduced settlement costs by 75%”. Without external verification, we should treat the 75% figure as indicative – it signals significant savings, though the exact fraction is hard to validate. It may pertain to a specific trade where, say, a Middle Eastern oil producer avoided costly letter-of-credit fees or exchange rate spreads by using RMB obtained via China’s system. 

It’s worth noting that some Middle Eastern countries are indeed exploring RMB for oil trade. Notably, Saudi Aramco and CNPC have discussed pricing some oil contracts in yuan. The UAE has been actively trialing digital currencies with China. These moves are part of a broader trend of de-dollarization in energy trade, albeit in the early stages. If any energy companies participated in the Chinese digital RMB pilot, their testimony might have informed that “75% cost reduction” claim. However, we lack a public, authoritative source confirming that exact number. The BIS or IMF have not (as of 2025) published a study on cost savings for energy trades in CBDC – this remains within the realm of pilot project reporting. 

Importantly, no contrary evidence is available — meaning we have no reason to believe the figure is fabricated, only that it comes from internal sources. It stands to reason that if transaction fees and currency conversion are minimized, profit margins for traders improve. A cut of “three quarters” of costs is optimistic but not inconceivable if, for example, a trader previously paid a 1% fee on a multi-million-dollar transfer and now pays 0.25%. 

In summary, the 23 central banks participating in tests are well-founded, echoed by BIS-related news, reflecting a global interest in what China is doing. The 75% cost reduction for Middle Eastern traders is a reported outcome of pilot usage; while we can’t directly verify the number, it plausibly underscores real savings and has not been refuted by any official source. We should consider it a specific success story rather than a guaranteed outcome for all trades. Going forward, it will be important to see if such cost reductions are confirmed by neutral studies as more central banks (potentially including those 23) continue trials or launch live CBDC links. 

RMB Cross-Border Settlement with ASEAN: ¥5.8 Trillion in 2024, and De-dollarization Signs (Reserves and Oil Trade) 

Claim: “RMB cross-border settlements with ASEAN exceeded ¥5.8 trillion in 2024, a 120% increase from 2021. Six countries (e.g. Malaysia, Singapore) have added the RMB to their foreign exchange reserves, and Thailand completed its first oil trade settled in digital RMB.” This highlights rapid growth in regional use of RMB and early moves to use RMB (even digital RMB) for commodities. 

Fact-check & Analysis: The figure of ¥5.8 trillion (approximately $0.8–0.9 trillion) in cross-border RMB settlement with ASEAN in 2024 appears to be grounded in official data. The phrasing “data shows that…” in many reports suggests it was published in a Chinese government or PBoC report on RMB internationalization. China’s central bank releases an annual RMB Internationalization Report with such statistics. The claim of a 120% increase since 2021 implies the 2021 value was around ¥2.6 trillion, growing to ¥5.8 trillion by 2024. This scale is plausible: China’s trade with ASEAN has been surging, and an increasing proportion of it is being settled directly in RMB. By 2024, ASEAN had become China’s largest trading partner bloc, and Beijing has encouraged the use of local currencies. The number is echoed in multiple sources, lending it credibility. Additionally, an official Xinhua release noted that overall cross-border RMB receipts and payments (globally) reached ¥41.6 trillion in the first 8 months of 2024. It’s reasonable that a subset of that (full-year, ASEAN-specific) is ¥5.8 trillion. Thus, we can trust this figure as reasonably accurate, likely drawn from PBoC statistics. It indicates a significant uptick in RMB usage for trade with Southeast Asia – consistent with the broader “de-dollarization” narrative. 

Regarding foreign exchange reserves: “Six ASEAN nations, including Malaysia and Singapore, have incorporated the RMB into their FX reserves”. This claim is credible and supported by known facts. Many central banks worldwide hold a portion of reserves in RMB since the Chinese yuan was added to the IMF’s SDR basket in 2016. Specifically in ASEAN, Malaysia, and Singapore were early adopters – both countries have sizable trade with China and have sought to diversify reserves. For instance, the Monetary Authority of Singapore has reported holding some RMB as part of its official reserves mix. Other ASEAN members that likely hold RMB in reserves could include Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and possibly Brunei. The claim says “six countries including Malaysia and Singapore,” which tracks: a 2022 report by the IMF’s COFER data showed about 6–7 central banks in Asia had some RMB. While not every ASEAN state publishes its reserve composition, it’s widely reported that Malaysia’s central bank (Bank Negara) holds a portion in yuan and even helped establish an offshore RMB clearing bank in Kuala Lumpur. Thus, this part of the claim is accurate – RMB is now a real if still small, component of several ASEAN nations’ reserves. It underscores growing confidence in the RMB as an international store of value. 

The mention of Thailand’s first oil trade settled in digital RMB is intriguing. This seems to reference a specific transaction. We need to clarify: was it Thailand that did this, or China? The Economic Times Government article phrased it as “Thailand has completed its first oil trade settled in digital yuan”. However, publicly known instances of oil or gas trades in yuan around that time involve China and other countries, not Thailand specifically as the buyer or seller using yuan. For example, in late 2023, PetroChina completed the first cross-border crude oil purchase using the digital yuan, paying in e-CNY for imported oil. It’s possible that oil was sold by a Middle Eastern country and the payment went through a digital yuan channel, with Thailand’s involvement being indirect (e.g., a Thai company or bank facilitating). Another interpretation: PTT (Thailand’s state oil company) and China’s CNOOC did an LNG trade in yuan (not explicitly digital yuan). Also, Thailand has been working with China on local currency settlement and might have tested using e-CNY for some energy imports. If indeed Thailand directly settled an oil transaction in e-CNY, it would be a notable first for an ASEAN country. 

There is scant independent news on “Thailand oil trade in digital RMB” aside from these repeated claims, which suggests it wasn’t widely covered – perhaps because it was more of a pilot than a market transaction. It could have been a small pilot shipment of petroleum or a test sale of oil to Thailand where payment was arranged in digital yuan as a proof of concept. Regardless, the spirit of the claim is that the RMB (and specifically the digital RMB) is now entering the oil trade arena, which has been dollar-dominated for decades. We do know China’s Shanghai Petroleum and Gas Exchange has facilitated some LNG trades in yuan, and there are ongoing talks with Gulf states about pricing oil in yuan. So this claim, while poorly documented in Western media, likely stems from a real pilot transaction signifying Thailand’s willingness to use RMB for commodities. We should treat it as an isolated but symbolic event – not that all Thai oil imports have moved to RMB, but that at least one was successfully done in that currency (possibly using e-CNY infrastructure). 

In summary, the ASEAN cross-border settlement figure (¥5.8 trillion) is strongly grounded in data, reflecting a rapid increase in RMB use. The inclusion of RMB in reserves by several ASEAN states is a confirmed trend (e.g., Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia) as they diversify away from the dollar. The Thai oil trade in digital RMB, while not widely reported by major outlets, is plausible as a trial demonstrating the RMB’s expanding role – we note it as a real but nascent development on the path of de-dollarization. These points collectively illustrate that China’s push for RMB internationalization (both conventional and digital) is yielding tangible results in its neighborhood, even if still limited relative to the dollar’s overall dominance. 

Integration with Belt and Road, and Advanced Tech: Beidou, Quantum Communication, and “400%” Efficiency Boost on Arctic Route 

Claim: “The digital RMB is integrated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, including linkage with Beidou satellite navigation and quantum communication for a ‘Digital Silk Road.’ In projects like the China-Laos Railway and Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail, digital RMB is used alongside these technologies. European carmakers are settling Arctic route freight in digital RMB, and China’s use of blockchain increased Arctic trade efficiency by 400%.” 

This claim connects China’s digital currency strategy with its broader trade and infrastructure agenda (BRI) and asserts a dramatic efficiency gain (400%) in Arctic shipping trade via blockchain and digital RMB. 

Fact-check & Analysis: There are multiple components here: 

• Integration with Belt and Road projects: China indeed envisions the digital RMB as part of the “Digital Silk Road,” which is the tech dimension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI, spanning over 140 countries, is not only about physical infrastructure but also about aligning financial systems. Chinese officials have indicated that digital currency can facilitate trade and investment along BRI routes by providing a common, China-linked payment medium. For instance, in BRI infrastructure projects like the China-Laos Railway, transactions (e.g. paying contractors, procurement) could be conducted in RMB. The mention of Beidou satellite navigation and quantum communication refers to China’s strategy to incorporate state-of-the-art tech in BRI: Beidou (China’s GPS alternative) is offered to partner countries for logistics and navigation, and quantum communication technology is being researched for ultra-secure data transmission (potentially to secure financial communications). The digital RMB network could leverage these – for example, Beidou could timestamp or track shipments whose payments are done in e-CNY, and quantum key distribution might protect transaction data. While this sounds futuristic, Chinese sources do highlight such integration. The Economic Times piece explicitly said, “Integrating the digital RMB with Beidou and quantum communication… enhances efficiency by 400%”. That phrasing is broad; it likely means that by combining efficient payment (digital RMB) with efficient logistics (Beidou-enabled tracking) and secure communication, overall trade processes can be much faster. 
• Digital RMB usage in projects like the Jakarta–Bandung High-Speed Railway: This is plausible. The Jakarta–Bandung HSR (in Indonesia) is a BRI project co-financed by China. It’s conceivable that payments to Chinese suppliers or workers on that project were made in RMB. Indonesia and China have a local currency settlement agreement, and Indonesia was one of the early partners exploring cross-border CBDC with China. If the digital RMB had been trialed, it could have been in settling invoices or wages for that project. We don’t have specific public records, but the claim is consistent with China’s push to use RMB in all aspects of BRI projects (reducing reliance on the USD). 
• European car manufacturers settling Arctic route freight in digital RMB: This is a very specific claim. The Arctic route refers to the Northern Sea Route (via the Arctic Ocean north of Russia) which China calls the “Polar Silk Road”. Some European companies have shipped goods via this route as it shortens the trip between East Asia and Europe in the summer months. The claim suggests European firms are paying for that freight using digital RMB. There’s no known public report of this from European sources. It might be a theoretical example or a trial. Possibly, a Chinese shipping company (like COSCO) carried cars or parts via the Arctic route and was paid in RMB. Or a European carmaker (say, BMW or Volvo) used RMB to settle a transaction with a Chinese logistics provider. Given that the digital RMB is still pilot-based, it’s unlikely many European companies have access to it directly; they might use normal RMB instead. This part of the claim seems more aspirational or anecdotal. It might have been mentioned in Chinese media as an example of RMB’s growing reach: “Even European firms are using digital RMB for Arctic shipping!” We should view it cautiously – it signals that China wants the RMB used even in new trade corridors, but solid evidence is lacking. 
• “Boosting efficiency by 400%” with blockchain on the Arctic route: A 400% efficiency increase implies a five-fold improvement (since 100% would be doubling, 400% is quadrupling plus baseline). This is a very large claim and it’s unclear what exactly is being measured. It could relate to administrative efficiency – perhaps the time to process shipping documents or the speed of payment released to carriers. If previously certain paperwork took days and now, using a blockchain platform, it takes hours, one might quantify that as several hundred percent faster. Another angle: if combining real-time satellite tracking (Beidou) with instant payment means ships spend less idle time waiting for clearance or payment confirmation, trade flow might accelerate. However, no neutral source confirms “400% efficiency gains.” This number appears solely in these propagative articles. It likely originated from a Chinese statement highlighting a specific improvement. For instance, maybe a pilot project tracked goods via blockchain and showed that tasks that used to require 5 hours of coordination now took 1 hour (which is a 400% efficiency gain, in the sense of doing five times as much in the same time). 

Without concrete metrics, 400% is best viewed as a rhetorical highlight. It underscores that China claims massive efficiency improvements by integrating fintech (blockchain payments) with logistics tech (Beidou) on new trade routes. But in an academic sense, we cannot verify “400%” as an exact figure – no academic or industry report quantifies it. It is likely an overstatement or misinterpretation of dramatic effect. 

Reliability assessment: The integration of digital RMB with BRI infrastructure is a real policy goal, and there is evidence of steps in that direction. For example, the PBoC has a Digital Currency Institute that often collaborates in pilot zones along BRI. Also, the mention that the BIS called China a “rule maker” in the digital currency era (the BIS reportedly said China is “defining the rules of the game” in CBDC) hints that international observers recognize China’s leadership. However, the “400% efficiency” claim lacks detail and appears in no formal study. Likewise, the scenario of European automakers using e-CNY for Arctic freight is not documented in Western media or academic research – it might be a projection of what could happen if China offers incentives. 

In conclusion, tying the digital RMB to the Belt and Road and advanced technologies is accurate in intent – China is indeed building a holistic ecosystem (financial + technological) to support its global trade networks. Beidou and quantum communication integration signal China’s ambition to have an independent and secure trading system. But claims like “efficiency enhanced by 400%” are likely inflated. They should be interpreted as China’s assessment of potential efficiency gains, not as rigorously verified statistics. The overall message is that China is marrying its digital currency with its geopolitical economic strategy, which is true, but the quantitative benefits (400% better) are not backed by independent evidence and thus should be taken with a grain of salt. 

Global Adoption and Reach: “87% of Countries” Adapted, $1.2 Trillion in Cross-Border Payments, 200 Countries Covered 

Claim: “Over 87% of the world’s countries are now digitally integrated with the RMB settlement system, with cross-border digital RMB payments exceeding $1.2 trillion, spanning more than 200 countries.”. This suggests a near-global adoption of China’s digital currency framework by early 2025. 

Fact-check & Analysis: This is perhaps the most sweeping claim, and on its face, it appears highly exaggerated when compared to known data. Let’s break it down: 

• “87% of countries” digitally integrated with the RMB system: There are about 195 sovereign countries on Earth (slightly more if counting territories). 87% of 195 is roughly 170 countries. It is not plausible that 170 countries have fully integrated the digital RMB by 2025. This number does not correspond to any official metric of adoption. It likely stems from mixing up a different statistic. One possibility: As of late 2024, China’s conventional cross-border payment network, CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System), had participating banks in 119 countries, and through indirect participants, could reach 185 countries. CIPS is often described as China’s alternative to SWIFT for RMB clearing. If one took “185 countries and regions” (from CIPS data) and divided by ~212 (counting regions, perhaps) you might get ~87%. Indeed, 185/212 ≈ 87%. So it seems the authors of the claim possibly conflated CIPS’s reach with digital RMB adoption. CIPS is primarily used for normal (non-digital-CBDC) RMB transactions by banks worldwide. Being “integrated with the RMB system” could refer to having access to RMB clearing via CIPS. But that is not the same as using the digital yuan. 

• As of 2025, the e-CNY is still mostly a domestic retail pilot, and its cross-border use is limited to pilots in a few countries. There is no way 170+ countries have integrated the e-CNY; many countries don’t even have relations with China’s financial system at that level. For comparison, the SWIFT network connects 200+ countries and 11,000 institutions. China’s CIPS (which again is not the digital RMB but the conventional RMB payment system) has about 1,600 participants in 119 countries. So the 87% figure is a clear inflation. Possibly it was meant to impress that “most countries” are somehow on board with China’s system. In reality, most countries are aware of or exploring CBDCs generally (about 130+ countries representing 98% of global GDP are researching CBDCs), but that’s their CBDCs, not specifically China’s. Only a small subset have any connectivity to China’s digital RMB pilot. 
• “Over $1.2 trillion in cross-border digital RMB transactions”: This number is also problematic. To date, the PBoC has not reported such a high volume for the digital RMB. The figure likely conflates cross-border RMB flows in general with “digital RMB”. For context, by mid-2024, total e-CNY transactions (almost entirely domestic retail) were about ¥7 trillion (roughly $1 trillion) since the pilot’s inception. But those are mostly inside China (e.g., consumer payments). Cross-border usage of e-CNY would be a tiny fraction of that. Meanwhile, as noted, China’s overall cross-border RMB payments (including normal RMB via CIPS) are huge – tens of trillions of yuan annually. For instance, CIPS processed $14 trillion in 2022. So $1.2 trillion is a relatively small portion of total RMB flows, but it’s enormous for digital yuan if that was the intent.  Perhaps the $1.2 trillion refers to cumulative cross-border RMB settlement volume achieved under some new initiatives or with certain countries since a starting point. It’s not an official number we could find in sources like BIS or IMF. By comparison, SWIFT handles about $5 trillion per day in global FX transfers, so $1.2 trillion in total is modest globally, but for a nascent system, it’s sizable. Given no official breakdown, we suspect this number was invented or cherry-picked by commentators to suggest that the digital RMB network has already moved over a trillion dollars. It could be that if one includes all trade settled in RMB with those pilot countries in a year, it sums to ~$1.2T, but again that’s not necessarily via the digital RMB. This claim cannot be verified with public data and likely overstates actual e-CNY cross-border usage by orders of magnitude. 
• “Across 200 countries”: This part is exaggerated. There aren’t 200 countries fully engaged with China’s digital currency (even 185 countries via CIPS was the extent of traditional RMB reach as of 2024 ). The number 200 is probably a rounding-up from the 185 figure to make it a round number, or a hyperbolic statement meaning “nearly the whole world.” It might also confuse the notion of countries supporting interoperability standards. For example, many countries use systems compatible with ISO-20022 (an international payment messaging standard that CIPS also uses), but that doesn’t equate to digital RMB adoption. 

In assessing reliability, this entire claim (#8) reads as overhyped and not supported by hard evidence. It seems to be a conclusion of the narrative trying to show that China’s system has taken the world by storm – which is not true as of 2025. Credible institutions (BIS, SWIFT, IMF) do not report that “87% of countries” are on China’s network; instead, they observe that China is making progress but the dollar and SWIFT remain dominant. For instance, a Brookings analysis in 2023 noted that while CIPS has grown, it’s still minor compared to SWIFT (CIPS has participants in ~100+ countries vs SWIFT in 200+, and processes only a fraction of SWIFT’s volume). IMF COFER data on reserves show RMB making up about 2.5% of global reserves in 2024 – hardly a wholesale replacement. So the idea that almost every country has “adapted” to the digital RMB is not grounded in reality. 

What might be true is that 87% of countries are exploring CBDCs (which was a figure in some studies) or that a large percentage of China’s trade partners have some RMB infrastructure. But framing it as they’ve joined China’s system is misleading. 

As for the $1.2 trillion cross-border payments claim, if we interpret it generously, it could be referring to all cross-border RMB payments through both traditional and new channels over a certain period, but attributing it to the digital RMB is incorrect. PBoC’s own published data would likely give a far lower number for actual digital yuan cross-border trials (probably measured in billions, not trillions, of yuan at this stage). 

Conclusion on this claim: It is not reliable. It conflates different things (CIPS coverage, global CBDC interest, and RMB trade volumes) into one grandiose statement. No official source validates “87% of countries” or “200 countries” using the digital RMB. This is an overstatement from a propagandistic perspective, likely aimed at showcasing an inevitable shift that in truth is only in its infancy. 

To sum up, claim #8 is largely inaccurate: it significantly overestimates the current adoption of the digital RMB worldwide. The reality is that while China’s digital currency initiatives have broad geopolitical reach, in theory, actual participation is much more limited. We recommend skepticism toward such sweeping figures unless clarified by rigorous data. Credible data shows China’s RMB network (CIPS) has a wide reach (119–185 countries connected in some form), but digital RMB usage itself is far from global at this point. 

Conclusion 

The passage in question paints a picture of the digital RMB revolutionizing global finance and rapidly displacing incumbent systems. Our fact-checking reveals a mix of truths, partial truths, and overstatements: 

• PBoC’s cross-border digital RMB push with ASEAN and Middle East countries is real in intent, but the specific announcement and framing (“fully connected” to 16 countries covering 38% of global trade) is not officially confirmed; it appears to be a synthesis by analysts of China’s ongoing pilots. The involved countries do account for a large share of trade, but actual usage of the digital RMB among them remains limited so far. 
• Technological advantages of the digital RMB system over SWIFT are correctly identified: faster settlement (seconds vs days) and potentially lower costs. Pilot studies by the BIS and others back the core claim that CBDCs can drastically speed up cross-border payments. The Hong Kong–Abu Dhabi trial story illustrates these benefits vividly, though the exact “7-second” timing and “98% fee cut” are based on an internal case. These numbers should be seen as achievable in pilots, if not average in all cases. They underscore the promise of CBDC technology. 
• Specifically reported successes like the China–Indonesia pilot (8-second payment, 100× efficiency) and involvement of 23 central banks in testing are credible and supported by evidence of broad interest (23 central banks observed BIS’s mBridge pilot). Likewise, anecdotal cost savings for Middle Eastern energy trades (75% less) align with the idea that removing dollar intermediaries can reduce costs for oil exporters, though we lack independent verification of the percentage. 
• RMB internationalization data (ASEAN ¥5.8 trillion in 2024 settlements, doubling since 2021) is factual, reflecting strong growth in RMB usage. Several ASEAN states adding RMB to reserves and at least one RMB-settled oil transaction by Thailand (or involving Thailand) were also reported, indicating concrete steps in de-dollarization, albeit in the early stages. These points show that China’s currency is gaining traction regionally, consistent with IMF and BIS observations of rising RMB usage (albeit from a small base). 
• Integration with Belt and Road and advanced tech is a strategic reality – China is indeed combining its digital currency rollout with its global infrastructure program. However, the claim of “400% efficiency improvement” on Arctic routes thanks to blockchain is unsubstantiated hyperbole. It likely emanates from enthusiastic estimates rather than measured results. We found no evidence that can confirm such a specific improvement. Therefore, while the concept of a Digital Silk Road linking e-CNY, Beidou, and other tech is valid, one should be skeptical of quantitative claims without sources. 
• Finally, the assertion that the digital RMB system already encompasses 87% of countries and $1.2 trillion in cross-border payments across 200 countries is overwhelmingly false or misinterpreted. This claim appears to conflate China’s broader RMB network reach with actual digital CBDC usage. No credible data supports those figures – they overshoot reality by a wide margin. In truth, China’s alternative payment network (CIPS) has a growing global footprint (banks in ~119 countries, indirect reach to ~185), and total RMB trade settlement is rising, but the digital RMB per se has only been piloted in a handful of jurisdictions. It is not adopted by 87% of the world. The $1.2 trillion figure likely does not specifically pertain to e-CNY and is not documented by institutions like the BIS or PBoC in any report we could find. 

In evaluation, many elements of the passage are rooted in real developments – China’s digital yuan is indeed at the forefront of CBDC innovation and is being tested in cross-border scenarios with some success. Speed and cost advantages are well-founded and threaten to disrupt the traditional SWIFT-based paradigm. Moreover, RMB internationalization is making measurable strides in Asia, eroding the dollar’s exclusivity in certain pockets. These aspects lend credibility to the overall narrative that a shift is underway. 

However, the passage also exaggerates the current scale and maturity of this shift. It sometimes presents desired future outcomes as if they are present facts, which is misleading. The digital RMB’s network effect is portrayed as nearly global, which is not the case when scrutinized against official data. Authoritative sources like the IMF and BIS would concur that while the digital yuan is a significant development, the US dollar and SWIFT remain dominant and China’s CBDC is at a pilot stage internationally. For instance, the IMF has cautioned that capital controls and limited convertibility of RMB constrain its international role (a point not mentioned in the rosy passage). 

In conclusion, the claims in the passage range from accurate (e.g., SWIFT vs e-CNY speed differences, rising RMB trade with ASEAN ) to somewhat exaggerated (e.g., breadth of central bank participation, the scale of cost reductions) to significantly overblown (global adoption percentages). As an academic assessment, one should separate the signal from the noise: 

• The signal is that China’s digital RMB is a groundbreaking project with the potential to reshape cross-border payments, especially for countries in Asia and the Middle East looking for alternatives to the dollar system. The efficiencies in speed and cost are real and demonstrated on a pilot scale. 
• The noise is the hype that all but proclaims the digital yuan’s victory over the dollar. Many of those quantitative claims (87% of countries, 38% of global trade bypassing SWIFT already) are not supported by current evidence and likely reflect a pro-China commentary slant rather than an objective snapshot. 

From a balanced perspective, reliable sources like BIS and SWIFT data suggest that while usage of RMB (digital or otherwise) is growing, it still constitutes a small fraction of global payments and reserves. The de-dollarization trend is gradual, not sudden; the digital RMB is an important catalyst, but its global impact is in the early days. Therefore, the passage’s implications should be tempered with the understanding that we are witnessing the beginning of a potential shift, not its culmination. 

References: 

• Bank for International Settlements (2021). Report on CBDCs and cross-border payments – which demonstrated that multi-CBDC platforms can settle international payments in seconds, versus days, and potentially cut costs by about 50%. 
• People’s Bank of China (2024). RMB Internationalization Report – cited by Xinhua, showing cross-border RMB usage (e.g., ¥41.6 trillion in the first 8 months of 2024) and rising RMB trade settlement share. 
• SWIFT RMB Tracker and IMF data – showing RMB’s share in global payments and reserves (roughly 2–3% by 2024). 
• Ledger Insights (2023). Coverage of mBridge pilot and international collaboration, noting 23 central banks involved as observers. 
• Reuters and Nikkei Asia reports on China’s cross-border e-CNY trials (with UAE, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia) confirming the objective of seconds-level settlement and significant cost reduction, though PBoC officials mentioned a more modest “up to 50%” cost cut in general cases. 
• Economic Times (ET Government) and other summary articles (2025) – which compiled these claims. While not peer-reviewed, they provide insight into what is being asserted publicly, which we have juxtaposed against the above authoritative data. 

By weighing these sources, we conclude that the passage’s narrative is partly accurate in qualitative terms but quantitatively inflated. It reflects a confident Chinese viewpoint of the digital RMB’s trajectory more than the sober reality. Researchers and analysts should continue to monitor official data from PBoC, BIS, and IMF to track how quickly (or slowly) these claims turn into concrete outcomes on the world stage.